Syracuse University

SURFACE
School of Information Studies - Faculty
Scholarship

School of Information Studies (iSchool)

2000

The Effects of Market-Enabling Internet Agents on Competition
and Prices
Kevin Crowston
Syracuse University, School of Information Studies

Ian Macinnes
Syracuse University, School of Information Studies

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/istpub
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Crowston, K. & MacInnes, I. The effects of market-enabling Internet agents on competition and prices.
Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 2(1). Available from: http://www.csulb.edu/web/journals/jecr/
issues/20011/paper1.htm.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Studies (iSchool) at SURFACE.
It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Information Studies - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

The effects of market-enabling Internet agents on competition and prices1
Kevin Crowston and Ian MacInnes
Syracuse University
School of Information Studies
4–206 Center for Science and Technology
Syracuse, NY 13244–4100
+1 (315) 443–1617
FAX: +1 (315) 443–5806
{crowston, imacinne}@syr.edu
Keywords: Electronic commerce, electronic markets, buyers’ agents, winner-take-all, price dispersion
To appear in Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 1(4), 2000.

Introduction
Abstract
The Internet offers a vision of ubiquitous electronic commerce. A particularly useful feature is the
ability to automate the search for price or other information across multiple vendors by using an
“agent” to retrieve relevant information. The use of
agents has the potential to dramatically reduce buyers’ search costs. We develop a framework that suggests that vendors who sell products with many differentiating factors beyond price will tend to accept
agents, while vendors of commodities or branded
goods will tend to resist them unless they have lower
costs than their competitors. Empirically, we found
that agents seem to be accepted for differentiated
goods, but resisted for more commoditized goods,
though not universally. An analysis of prices from
one agent shows that 1) a small number of vendors
tended to have the lowest prices and 2) while divergence in pricing remains, price dispersion declined
over the period studied.
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Networks bridge geography, distance and culture, creating new opportunities for interaction and
competition. Debate is increasing on how the ongoing digital and communications revolution will
change the nature of commerce. The growth of commerce on the Internet has attracted special interest.
Being a public network and increasingly ubiquitous,
the Internet neatly addresses the problem of connectivity between potential trading partners (Neches,
Neches, Postel, Tenenbaum, & Frank, n.d.), extending even to consumers. The existence of multiple
vendors for some goods leads to the possibility of a
market for those items, in the specific sense of multiple vendors whose prices and offerings are compared
for each sale.2
Clearly there are many potential obstacles to Internet commerce—the need for security, authentication and payment schemes are frequently mentioned,
as are the lack of negotiation protocols or even commonly accepted business practices—but these are
rapidly being addressed. Internet sales are expected
to continue to increase, following the lead of catalogue and television sales. There are already numerous Internet vendors selling a variety of products,
including music CDs, computer hardware and software and a host of others.

Parts of this work appeared earlier as Crowston, K. (1996). “Market-enabling Internet agents”. In J. I. DeGross, S. Jarvenpaa
and A. Srinivasan (Eds.), Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems, Columbus, OH and Crowston, K. (1997). “Price behaviour in an electronic market”. (Research in progress paper, International Conference on Information Systems, Atlanta, GA). This paper has benefited from discussions with Martha Garcia-Murillo, Sunil Gupta, Robert
Heckman, Junseok Hwang, Jian Qin, Dmitri Roussinov, Steve Sawyer, George Widmeyer, Rolf Wigand and Ping Zhang and
from the assistance of Jackie Chang, Rajah Shah and Phillip Strnad. This work was partially supported by a grant from the iLab, London Business School.
Note that we do not consider as markets a single merchant who stocks multiple products or a “mall” hosting multiple merchants but lacking features for making price or other comparisons across merchants. This definition excludes many selfdescribed markets, such as Industry Net.

Effects of market making Internet agents

The basic argument of this paper is that one approach to developing an Internet marketplace is
through the use of an “agent.” An agent is a program,
simple or intelligent, that operates autonomously to
retrieve and process information on a user’s behalf
(Maes, 1994). In this paper, we focus on the use of
agents to support a potential purchase decision. The
idea is that a computer program can retrieve (or even
negotiate, e.g., Chavez, Dreilinger, Guttman, &
Maes, 1997) price, availability, and other product
information for a desired good and compare them to
identify the vendor with the lowest-cost or best set of
features, thus automating part of the purchase process
and increasing market efficiency. For example, Andersen Consulting’s Bargain Finder agent (Krulwich,
1996), now defunct, took the name and artist of a
music CD and retrieved its price from several Internet CD stores with on-line searchable catalogues.
This agent quickly identified which vendors carry the
CD and facilitated easy price comparisons, key characteristics of an efficient market.

already available to assist in navigation and information retrieval (e.g., O'Leary, 1996). Deployed on the
Internet, agents make searching for information easier. Guttman et al. (1998) note that agents can support
different stages of a buyer’s purchasing process: need
identification, product and merchant brokering, negotiation, purchase and delivery, and service and
evaluation. Similarly, Jonkheer (1999) provides a
model of a transaction to show where agents can
make provide assistance. Agents assist buyers because they can retrieve relevant information directly
from on-line vendors and present it to a potential
buyer in summary form (e.g., Chavez et al., 1997;
Doorenbos, Etzioni, & Weld, 1997; Etzioni & Weld,
1995; Yovovich, 1995).
In this paper, we focus in particular on the use of
agents to choose a vendor for a particular good, what
Guttman et al. (1998) call merchant brokering.
Greenwald and Kephart (1999) call such an agent a
“shopbot”. When such an agent operates across the
range of vendors offering a product (what Yovovich
(1995) referred to as a buy-side agent, rather than a
sell-side agent), it essentially creates an electronic
market comprising the offerings of these vendors.
Viewing agents as market enablers has the advantage
of bringing to bear the extensive literature on markets, electronic and otherwise.

The remainder of the paper is presented in two
parts. First, we discuss the function of market-search
agents. The distinctive contribution of this paper is a
framework for the role of such agents in electronic
commerce. This framework is summarized in a payoff matrix showing the outcomes from decisions by
vendors to cooperate or resist the use of agents.
Analysis of the incentives for participation in an
electronic market is a necessary precondition for their
development. In this, our goals are similar to those of
Reimers (1996), who analyzed the institutional and
incentive structure pre-conditions for electronic markets. We use our framework to predict the kind of
goods for which agents are likely to be successful.

Of course, electronic markets are nothing new.
Formal electronic markets have developed for specific goods, such as airline reservation systems, stock
markets, as well as electronic markets for electric
power (Johnson, 1995), airliner parts (Choudhury,
1997; Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1989, p. 167),
truck capacity (Steinfield, Kraut, & Plummer, 1995)
and
even
seeds
(SeedQuest
OnLine,
http://www.seedquest.com/). However, agent-enabled
markets differ in at least two significant respects.

In the second half of the paper, we compare the
predictions of our framework with illustrative examples of buyer’s agents for a range of products. We
note a prominent counter-example to our predictions,
shopper.com. To further explore the framework, we
report on an analysis of price data gathered from
shopper.com. We use this data to explore the fit between the framework’s predictions and empirical
observation. In particular, we test a crucial assumption of the framework, that the vendor that has the
lowest prices for one product will be cheapest for
many (“winner-take-all”). We also examine changes
in prices over time to test a common prediction of the
electronic commerce literature, that better information leads to convergence of prices (e.g., Bakos,
1991).

Literature Review
Agents are software programs that operate
autonomously to retrieve and process information on
a user’s behalf (Maes, 1994). Many simple agents are
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•

First, the Internet is non-proprietary and public,
so it is possible for an agent to access prices
from a variety of vendors without special technical arrangements. As a result, an agent can create
an effective electronic market from the diverse
offerings of independent vendors (the “involuntary market” propery), at least in the sense of facilitating the contact between buyer and seller
(Bailey & Bakos, 1997; Malone, Yates, & Benjamin, 1987).

•

Second, an agent can search vendors in parallel
rather than sequentially, thus reducing search
costs to zero at the margin (the “zero-marginalsearch-cost” property). Of course, even a simple
database of prices could have this effect, although creating such a database without the cooperation of the vendors basically requires creating an agent to gather the prices.

